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Abstract 
This study examined whether strong support for density dependence 
hypothesis in previous studies was due to unobserved inter-firm 
heterogeneity Using the population of Dutch accounting firms, we 
compared two models one wthout firm heterogeneity vanables and the 
other unth those vanables Fu-m heterogeneity vanables examined here 
included the adoption of a partner-associate structure, firm slze, the 
number of domestic offices, firm-level human and social capital, 
founding type, and organizational changes. Results indicated that 
regardless of the inclusion of firm heterogeneity vanables, density had a 
strong U-shaped relation mth failure rates as predicted by denslty 
dependence hypothesis Implications and future research directions 
were discussed 
1. Introduction 
Dur ing  t h e  p a s t  two decades ,  popula t ion  ecology h a s  
con t r ibu ted  to  organiza t iona l  sociology by  showing t h e  
importance of environmental factors in explaning founding and 
failure rates of organizations. Among those factors, density - 
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number of organizations in a population - has been most 
emphasized. With some exceptions (e.g., Delacroix, 
Swaminathan, and Solt (1989), Barnett and Amburgey (1990), 
Baum and Oliver ( 1992), and Ranger -Moore ( 1997)), extant 
studies on density dependence of founding and failure rates 
generally produced results consistent wth  the hypothesis across 
diverse populations (see Singh and Lumsden (1990) for a revlew; 
Hannan and Carroll (1992)). 
However, there has been an important debate on whether the 
strong support for density dependence of failure rates in 
previous s tudies  i s  due  to unobserved heterogeneity.') 
Unobserved heterogeneity exists when at least one important 
independent variable that affects dependent variable is omitted. 
Therefore most empirical studies are susceptible to this 
unobserved heterogeneity problem. The problem becomes 
serious especially when the inclusion of omitted variables alters 
relationships that are found to exist in observed model. Petersen 
and Koput (199 1) raised this question about density dependence 
hypothesis Using simulation, they showed that unobserved 
heterogeneity, independent of density dependence, could 
generate a positive relationship between density and failure 
rates.2) 
This s tudy empirically tes ts  the  density dependence 
hypothesis while controlling for organizational heterogeneity. 
The hypothesis is supported if the density has a predicted effect 
on failure rates even when organizational innovation and firm- 
specific resources are introduced in the model. If significant 
influence of density disappears after controlling for 
organizational heterogeneity, the present study can suggest that 
strong support for density dependence hypothesis in previous 
studies may have been due to unobserved heterogeneity. 
Organizational heterogeneity controlled in this study includes 
the adoption of a partner-associate structure, a firm's relahve 
size, the number of domestic offices, human and social capital 
1) Lorn (1995) quesboned the validlty of the dens~ty dependence hypothesis in 
explairung organizahonal founding rates He reported that reg~onal denslty 
rather than nabonal density was a better measure to explan orgmzational 
foundlng rates 
2) Additional analysis of Hannan and Carroll (1992) used simulation model 
provided by Petersen and Koput They showed that results reported in 
Petersen and Koput (1991) were not typical 
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t ha t  firm has  through i ts  members, founding type, and 
organizational changes.  By controlling for fine-grained 
organizational level variables, this study can expose the strength 
of density dependence formulation. 
2. Density Dependence Hypothesis 
Hannan and Freeman (1987, 1988, 1989) proposed the 
density dependence hypothesis of organizational founding and 
falure rates The hypothesis posited that the density will have a 
U-shaped relat~on with the failure rates and an inverted U-shaped 
relat~on with the found~ng rates. Legitimation and competition 
processes lead to the hypothesis. Initial growth in density 
increases legitimacy of organizational forms. The enhanced 
legitimacy lowers failure rates and elevates founding rates. The 
process leads to rapid growth m density during the early stage of 
population development. When density grows high enough, 
additional growth in density does not enhance legitimacy but 
instead increases competition among organizations. The 
competition process elevates failure rates and lowers founding 
rates. As a result, density stabilizes during the late stage of 
population development. With some excephons, extant studies 
produced results that were consistent with the hypothesis over 
diverse populations from diverse geographical areas (see Singh 
and Lumsden (1990) for a review, and Hannan and Carroll 
( 1992)). 
In population ecology formulation, each organization 
contributes same degree of legitimation and competition to a 
population. This assumption of homogeneity receives a great 
deal of criticism. Winter (1990) for instance claimed that large 
firms contribute more to competition and industry evolution 
than do small firms. To deal with the criticism, Hannan and 
Carroll (1992) introduced the concept of mass and controlled for 
it in estimating falure rates. The mass is the population density 
mth each organization weighted by its size. Mass dependence 
interpretat ions were based on the  recognition of size 
heterogeneity among firms. 
Hannan and Carroll (1992) added total mass and firm size in 
estimating failure rates and reported that density still had a 
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significant and consistent U-shaped relationship w t h  failure 
rates. They concluded that  these findings favored density 
dependence of failure ra tes  over a mass-dependence 
explanation. However, they did not have the data for populabon 
mass and firm size over much of the long periods studied. They, 
consequently, could not effectively control the influence of 
population mass and organizat~onal size on failure rates. In a 
study of falure rates in the population of Manhattan banks over 
the two hundred year history, Banaszak-Holl (1991) also 
reported a U-shaped relabonship between density and failure 
rates even when bank's size and population mass were added in 
the model as time varying covanates. 
3. Criticisms and Inconsistent Findings 
Despite the strong empirical support for density dependence 
hypothesis, the ecological paradigm has been cnticized on the 
bases  of i t s  conceptual validity and  the  precision of 
measurements. Earlier formulations of population ecology 
emphasized the importance of heterogeneity in the evolubon of 
population. For instance, Hannan and Freeman's (1977) fitness 
theory was based on the assumption of firm heterogeneity. 
Freeman and Hannan's study on the s u ~ v a l  of specialists and 
generalists interacting with environmental characteristics 
(Freeman and Hannan (1983, 1987)) illustrated the importance 
of organizational heterogeneity in population ecology. Aldrich's 
(1979) notion of variation also stressed organizational 
heterogeneity Under the condition of heterogeneity, the 
environment-induced negative selection can  reinforce 
organizations with viable charactenstics (Hannan and Freeman 
(1977). Aldrich (1979)) 
Later development on the density dependence hypothes~s 
(Hannan and Freeman (1987, 1988), Carroll and Hannan 
(1989a)). however, relies on homogeneity assumption. It 
assumed that each organization contributes the same degree of 
population legitimacy and produces same degree of competition 
with other organizations. With this assumption, Hannan and 
Freeman's (1977) original ideas of "the maximization by the 
selecbon environment" cannot be explored. In empirical studies 
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on denslty dependence, organizations are heterogeneous only 
w t h  respect to thew age, age cohort, and slze. 
In contras t  with the  denslty dependence hypothesis, 
evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter (1982), Winter 
(1990)) and the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose (1959)) 
adopted the assumphon of organlzational heterogeneity rather 
than homogeneity. Evolutionary economics begins with the 
assumption that organlzations have divergent competencies or 
technologies. An entrepreneur's entry (Schumpeter (1934)) or an  
mcumbent's Innovative search (Nelson and Winter (1982)) are 
among the events that generate organizational heterogeneity. 
Under the condition of heterogeneity, selection mechanism can 
reinforce vlable organlzations by grantmg them more resources. 
The assumption of organizational heterogeneity and the 
existence of selechon mechanism are consistent with the fitness 
theory of earlier study of Hannan and Freeman (1977) but  
lnconslstent with their density dependence formulahon. In sum, 
scholars who emphasize organizational heterogeneity are more 
interested in what kinds of organizatzons perform better, while 
those who emphasize density dependence in population ecology 
are more interested in what condztzons render organizations to 
be more prone to emerge or fail. 
Concern with measurement i s sues  is also related to  
conceptual developments regarding legitimacy and competition. 
Zucker (1989) and Delacrolx and Rao (1994) claimed that  
density is not a good legihmacy proxy of organlzational forms. 
Winter (1990) questioned the valldity of denslty in measuring 
compehtlon and recommended instead firm size and location. 
Baum and Mezias (1992) and Baum and Singh (1994a, 1994b) 
acknowledged the importance of organlzatlonal heterogeneity 
and formulated localued competition, under which organizahons 
are more likely to compete with similar organizations than with 
dissimilar ones. The recognition of orgmational  heterogeneity 
itself questioned the validity of density as  a measure of the 
degree of competition 
Several studies Included organlzational-level charactenstics in 
estimating the effect of density on vital rates and reported 
findings that  were discrepant with the denslty dependence 
hypothesis. With a population of Pennsylvania telephone 
companies, Barnett and Arnburgey (1990) showed density to 
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have a major effect on founding and failure rates, with the 
relationship being curvilinear a s  predicted by the density 
dependence hypothesis. However, when population mass was 
included in the equation, only competition was related w t h  
founding and failure rates. In other words, the first-order density 
had a negative effect on founding rates and a positive effect on 
failure ra tes ,  while the  effects of density squared term 
disappeared from the equation. Baum and Oliver (1992) reported 
similar findings. In an effort to model the effects of external ties 
on founding and failure rates, they included the number of ties 
that organizations had w t h  their institutional environments. 
Whereas they found a strong support for the density dependence 
hypothesis when the measure of external embeddedness was not 
mcluded, they reported a pure compehtion effect of density with 
the inclusion of embeddedness. The two studies cast some 
doubts  on the empirical validity of density dependence 
hypothesis. 
4. Alternative Explanations: Innovation and Competition 
Some scholars provided alternative explanations for a common 
pattern of density changes - slow initial growth in density with 
rapid acceleration, followed by a peak, and then decline and 
stabilization - for which the density dependence model was 
formulated to explain They claimed that competition among 
heterogeneous firms can produce the common pattern of density 
changes and tha t  innovations are  major source of firm 
heterogeneity. 
Using simulation, Petersen and Koput (1991) showed that 
unobserved heterogeneity could generate the first-order effect of 
density on failure rates. They constructed a single populahon of 
10,500 organizations consisting of five subpopulations unth 
variable mortality rates that are constant over time and hence 
independent of density In each period, they created equal 
number of organizations in each subpopulation. With the 
simulated population, Petersen and Koput found a negative 
relation between density and failure rates. When they controlled 
for the previously unobserved heterogeneity, the density did not 
have any effect on the failure rates. The reason was that  
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organizations with low failure rates increased with density, as 
organizations with high failure rates were removed from the 
population. Levinthal (1992) also showed that pure selection 
forces coupled with rational calculation of economic return of 
entry and exit could generate the U-shaped relation between 
density and failure rates. 
Scholars in evolutionary economics (e.g., Gort and Klepper 
(1982),  Winter (1984), Klepper and Graddy (1990), and 
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994)) provided other logic that can 
explain similar trajectory of density: initial growth in density, 
shake-outs, and ~tabilization.~) They dealt with competition 
among organizations w ~ t h  eterogeneous competenc~es  
Organizahonal heterogeneity in an industry is a regularity rather 
than an exception (Lippman and Rumelt (1982), Iwai (1984a)). 
Rational decisions of entry and exit, innovations and imitations, 
and competition among heterogeneous organizations can lead to 
equivalent trajectories of density. Their underlying assumptions 
are heterogenetty among organizations and market selection 
mechanisms. 
Innovative search processes generate organizational 
heterogeneity in Winter's (1984) model. Uncertain imitability 
(Lippman and Rumelt (1982)) as  well as  innovations of new 
entrants and incumbent organizations (Schumpeter (1934), 
Nelson and Winter (1982), Iwai (1984b)) contributes to the 
persistence of heterogeneity among firms that  produce a 
homogeneous product. Gort and Klepper (1982) collected the 
historical trends of the number of organizations, outputs, and 
price as  well as  technological innovations in the industry of 46 
new products. They found similar density trajectory as  described 
in population ecology in most of aged industries: slow initial 
growth in density with rapid acceleration, followed by a peak, 
and then decline and stabilization. They reported that the 
frequencies and characteristics of technological innovations 
could well explain the changes m density 
Product life cycle formulations (e.g., Abernathy and Townsend 
(1975), Utterback and Abernathy (1975), Abernathy (1978), and 
3) Winter (1984) did not posit any precise relationship between density and 
falure rates However, his simulation results demonstrated that under some 
conditions innovation and irmtahon coupled with compehhon can generate a 
S-shaped density curve 
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Utterback (1979)) also explained the equivalent historical 
trajectory of density. In the early stage of industry development, 
producers have uncertainty over what customers want. 
Customers also have uncertainty about their needs and 
desirable characteristics of a product because the product is 
new to them. Due to the uncertainty, producers use  
heterogeneous technologies and produce heterogeneous 
products. Because of the uncertmty and heterogeneity among 
producers, customers cannot directly compare the products of 
diverse producers. It means that the selection mechanism 1s not 
strong. Because of the mitial uncertainty and worry on the entry 
of more efficient producers, incumbent producers hesitate to 
Increase their scale even though they are most efficient at the 
time of decision (Porter and Spence (1982)). With increasing 
demand over bme, the period can be characterized by high entry 
and exit rate as well as increase m density. 
As dorn~nant  designs emerge, organizatlons capable of 
producing the dominant designs expel others from the market 
place. Furthermore, the standardlzation of product features 
enables customers to compare prices and qualities of products 
and thus  generates a strong selection environment. The 
customers' selection drlves out organizatlons that cannot 
produce dominant design efficiently. The emergence of dominant 
designs is also related with the emergence of process technology 
that enables large-scale operation. The introduction of dominant 
designs and standardized product and process technology 
results In the emergence of large producers. Slnce large 
producers drive out small producers from the market, thls 
period can be characterized as penod of "shake-outs." 
After the emergence of dominant designs, product and process 
innovations become incremental (Abernathy and Utterback 
( 1975)). The slowdown of major innovations stabilizes the 
number of organizations in the Industry Studies on automobile 
and airframe industries (Klein (1977)) a s  well a s  on steel, 
petroleum, and tire industries (Mansfield (1962)) provided 
suggestive evidences for product life cycle explanations. 
Stobaugh (1988) applled the product life cyale formulabon to 
non-assembled products. The number of methanol producers in 
the US monotonically mcreased during the period of 1926-1966 
from 1 to 15. After 1966, the number monotonically decreased 
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until 1973 when there were 9 producers (Stobaugh (1988: 120- 
12 1)). The average annual production per manufacturer grew 
from 2.8 million gallons in 1930 to 1 18 million gallons m 1973. 
The decrease in the number of producers and the sharp increase 
in the average annual production per methanol manufacturers 
after 1966 can be attributed to the introduction of a major 
process innovation: a low-pressure process of producing 
methanol. The low-pressure process, which Impenal Chemical 
Industries (ICI) first introduced in 1966, had tremendous cost 
advantages. The advantages included "higher efficiency, lower 
energy consumption, longer catalyst life, increased reliability, 
lower maintenance costs, and greater economtes of scale from 
large plants" (Italics: our emphasis, Stobaugh (1988: 116)). ICI's 
low-pressure technology and an imitative innovation of Lurgi 
Minerraloltechnik forced existing plants to shut down or to 
convert to the new process. By 1982, all methanol produced in 
the US was through the low-pressure process. Stobaugh's study 
illustrated the importance of technological innovation and 
competition in shaping industry structure by showing that the 
introduction and diffusion of a low-pressure process to 
manufacture methanol determined the industry density - the 
number of manufacturers. 
In sum,  evolutionary economics and product life cycle 
formulahons provlded an alternabve explanahon for describing 
the density trajectory. The common underlying constructs are 
organizational heterogeneity and selection mechanism rather 
than legitimabon and compehtion emanabng from the density 
itself. The explanation predicts that the U-shaped relationship 
between density and  failure ra tes  will disappear when 
organizational heterogeneity variables such as  organizational 
innovabon and resources are controlled. 
5. Data and Methods 
5.1. Data collection 
Data for this study cover the entire population of Dutch 
accounting firms from 1880 to 1990. Firm level data were 
extracted from the membership directories of accounting 
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associations. During the  first eight decades, there were 
numerous associations, each urlth its own membership roster 
until all of them merged into a single association in 1966. The 
directories provide information about  the  members of 
associations and about accounting firms. 
Individual level data were collected with one to five year 
intervals, depending on the avalability of directories. For before 
1970, there are one four-year (1919- 1923) and one five-year 
intervals (1941-1946). From 1970 to 1974, each year was 
recorded, while after 1974, every fourth year was recorded. 
Individual level data included accountant's name, address, 
education, and status in the firm, if applicable. Also included in 
the directories was employment affiliation - the name of audit 
firm, business firm, or governmental agency. The directories also 
provided the names of cities where each accounting f m  had an 
office. 
5.2. Analytic Strategy 
Many studies on density dependence used only founding and 
dissolving dates or years. To replicate the density dependence of 
failure rates, we assumed that we had information about only 
foundmg and failing years. Strong predicted effects of density on 
failure rates under the assumption would indicate that the 
sample for this study is not a peculiar one. With the data, we 
identified a model that has the best goodness of fit. The model 
was used as a baseline model for additional analysis that 
mcluded proxies of organizational heterogeneity. 
In the second set of models, we introduced organizational 
characteristics beyond those included in the first set of models. 
The disappearance of density effect would suggest that strong 
supports for the density dependence in previous studies might 
be due to unobserved heterogeneity. Otherwise, the findings may 
indicate that  density dependence formulation is  a sound 
formulation m the population of the present study. 
5.3. Measures for the First Set of Equations (Replication of Previous 
Investigations) 
Orgamzational founding was idenbfied when the organization 
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was first registered in the directory, while organizahonal failure 
was indicated by permanent disappearance of its name from the 
directory. The number of firms a t  a focal time measured the 
density. To take into account competition level at the time of 
founding (Carroll and Hannan (1989b)), we controlled for density 
at founding. Carroll and Hannan's density delay hypothesis 
posited that organizations founded a t  high density had high 
falure rates because they were forced to occupy penpheral and 
non-affluent niches and  did not have opportunit ies to  
accumulate resources for migrating into affluent niches. The 
number of firms at the hme of a focal firm's founding indicated 
density at founding. 
Also controlled was organizational age. The liability of newness 
argument (Stinchecombe (1 965), Hannan and Freeman (1984). 
Ranger-Moore (1997)) holds that  young organizations have 
higher failure rates due to lack of established rules and of 
legitimacy in the web of organizahonal networks. Organizational 
age was measured by years elapsed after founding. Although the 
density at founding and organizational age are indicators of 
organizational heterogeneity, we controlled them to replicate 
prevlous studies on density dependence in which those variables 
were usually controlled for. 
We also controlled for the annual average numbers of 
foundugs and failures during the previous observation period as  
time-varying covariates. Delacroix, Swaminathan, and Solt 
(1989) argued that these two numbers have a negative effect on 
failure rates. The number of prior foundings indicates the 
existence of a new niche into which existlng organizahons could 
migrate. The possibility of migration renders the association 
between prior foundings and failure rate negative. They also 
maintained that prior failures free up resources that can be 
used by survivors. The availability of resources freed up by 
failing organizations decreases the failure rates of survivors. 
Since we had non-uniform observation intervals, we used the 
annual average numbers of foundings and failures dunng the 
previous observahon interval 
We controlled for proxies of "history", including World War 11, 
Indonesia's independence in 1949, and significant changes in 
regulations that governed the accounting profession and its 
clients. The effects of World War I1 and Indonesia's independence 
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were short-lived. World War I1 was specified as if it would have 
effects during the  period 194 1 - 1947 and  Indonesia's 
independence during the period of 1949- 195 1. Government 
regulations during 1914- 1918 and 1929 that dealt with short- 
term political and economic changes may not have long-lastmg 
effects on failure rates. Government regulations dunng 1914- 
19 18 and of 1929 were modeled to have its effect dunng 1914- 
1920 and during 1929- 193 1 respectively. Significant changes in 
regulahons such as  the mandatory auditing of all listed firms, 
which changed the demand for audit services, would have 
persistent effects until its abolition. Because the regulations 
were still effective in 1990, they were specified as if they had 
effects during the entire period following the onset of the 
regulations. Also controlled was the period when only a single 
powerful accountant association existed in the Netherlands. 
Since the single association was established in 1966, we used a 
dummy variable that was set to 1 after 1966, and 0 otherwise. 
We also controlled the length of observation intervals. The 
possibility of failure during time t and time t+d may be positively 
related with the length of d. Since d ranged from one to five 
years in this study, we introduced four dummies to handle these 
non-uniform observation intervals. To obtain a parsimonious 
model, we also tried the natural loganthm of d. Four dummies to 
represent the length of prevtous observation interval are 
introduced, because the observed annual average number of 
foundings and failures during previous observation interval 
would depend on its length. When we measured the number of 
foundings and failures with a five-year interval, for instance, 
organizations that were both founded and failed during the 
interval were not counted a s  foundings or failures. These 
organizations would be counted as foundings and failures if we 
observed them with one-year observation interval. 
Figure 1 presents historical variation of density and the 
number of single proprietors. Figure 2 presents the historical 
variation of foundings and failures Since the data used in this 
study have non-uniform observation intervals, we presented the 
annual average number of foundings and failures in Figure 2. 
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5.4. Measures for the Second Set of Equations: Introducing 
Organizational Heterogeneity 
In the second set of equations, we introduced organizational 
level characteristics. Data on accountants were aggregated to 
produce organizational level information. Organizational 
foundings, falures, and changes were measured by examining 
changes in accountants' organizational affiliation. Organlzahonal 
Year - - .  - 
Figure 1. Historical Variations in Density for the Population of 
Dutch Accounting Firms 
Year 
Figure 2. Historical Variations in the Number of Founding8 and 
Failures (Only with Founding and Failing Years: No Organizational 
Changes) 
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changes examined in this study included merger, acquisition, 
split, and name change. Name change was recorded when a 
f m ' s  name differed from its previous one, provided two-thirds 
or more of its partners continued their affiliation with the firm. 
Name change did not include changes due to merger or 
"cosmetic" name changes such as modifications in the order of 
named par tners ,  additions of the  Dutch equivalents of 
"Accountants" or "Registered" and "Limited Liability" to the 
firm's origmal name. 
Organizational split was recorded when at least two partners 
left and formed a new firm while the remaining partners 
continued to work for the ex~sting firm. When the defecting 
partners joined another firm, the departure was not treated as a 
split but as  a lateral movement Holder of the exlsting firm's 
name was regarded as  a continuation of the existmg firm. 
When two or more firms joined together and adopted one of 
the pre-existing names, the event was coded as an acquisition. 
The firm that maintained its name was coded as an acquirer, 
and others were coded as the acquired firms. When two or more 
firms joined together and adopted a new name, the event was 
coded as a merger. Conbuation of the firm was assigned to the 
largest of the involving f m s .  Other smaller counterparts were 
treated as  merged firms. When the size of the involved firms was 
equal, the new firm was treated as the continuation of the firm 
whose name is alphabetically ahead. In identifying the events. 
we used the criterion of two-thirds of partners. That is, two- 
thirds or more of the partners should join a new firm to be 
considered a s  a counterpart to merger or acquisition. The 
decision rule of treating the new firm as a continuahon of one of 
two or more existing firms in these cases is unavoidable, since 
event history analysis precludes the treatment of an observation 
as the continuation of two different entities. 
Organizational founding was coded when a new name was 
listed in the directories for the first time without merger or name 
change. A firm founded by the split of partners from existing 
firms was also treated as a founding. Failure was flagged when a 
firm's name was permanently delisted from the directories 
without merger or name change. Density, density at founding, 
the number of foundings and falures were constructed based on 
the new measure of organizational foundings and failures. 
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Based on the new measure of organizational foundings and 
failures, we constructed organizational level variables. We 
controlled the types of foundings by using a dummy that was set 
to 1 if it was founded by a split, 0 otherwise. We also controlled 
the  number  of organizational changes tha t  a focal firm 
experienced. They included the cumulative number of mergers, 
acquisitions, splits, and name changes. If organizational 
changes hampered the reliability of organizations and reseted 
the liability of newness clock (Hannan and Freeman (1984), 
Amburgey, Kelley, and Barnett (1993)), they would increase 
failure rates. Also controlled were the number of a focal 
organization's domestic offices, and its relative slze. The number 
of accountants associated with a focal firm divided by the total 
number of accountants in the industry proxied the relative size. 
To incorporate Winter's (1990) claim that large firms generate 
more competition t h a n  do small f irms,  we constructed 
population mass. The number of accountants who were affiliated 
mth  all accounting firms in each observabon period measured 
population mass. To avoid the pressure of competibon from a 
focal organization itself, we subtracted the focal firm's size from 
the population mass. 
Other heterogeneity factors included human and social capital 
of organizations. Human and social capital that an organization 
developed is the most important competitive resources of 
accounting firms (Pennings, Lee and Witteloostuijn (1998)). 
Human capital was measured by two indicators - general 
human capital and firm-specific human capital of the firms. The 
proportion of CPAs who possessed a Master's or higher degree 
among all CPAs in the firm measured general human capital. 
Firm-specific human capital was measured by the average of 
CPA's firm-specific human capital, which was measured by the 
natural logarithm of his/her tenure m the focal accounting fm. 
The speed of firm-specific knowledge accumulation was 
assumed to decrease over the accountant's tenure. 
Social capital was proxied by two measures. One was the 
proporhon of CPAs among all CPAs in the firm who had worked 
in other industries or government. The other was the proportion 
of CPAs among quitters who left the firm in the previous 10 
years to work for other industries or government but never came 
back to the accounting industry. A ten-year span was adopted, 
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not only because the strength of network ties decreases with 
time, but also because the quitters are bound to retire from the 
business world and would provide no longer any value to the 
firm. For comparison, 5 and 15 year spans were also tested 
Sensitivity analysis showed that the results reported here were 
not significantly different. 
We also controlled the adoption of structural innovation - a 
partner-associate structure. The partner-associate structure 
enables organizations to accumulate human and social capital 
and facilitates the emergence of large accounting firms. Rather 
than using dummy variables for the adopters, we constructed a 
continuous variable, leverage ratto, which was the number of 
associate accountants divided by the number of partners. 
Figure 3 presents the historical variation of foundings and 
failures. As in Figure 2, we presented annual average number of 
foundings and failures to handle non-uniform observation 
intervals. Comparing Figure 2 and Figure 3, we can notice a 
decrease in the number of foundings and failures in Figure 3 
after 1960. The decrease was due to many organizational 
changes that were counted as  organizational foundings and 
failures in Figure 2. In fact, a great deal of mergers and 
acquisitions happened and many organizations changed their 
name after 1960. 
Year 
Figure 3. Historical Variations in the Number of Foundings and 
Failues (Organizational Changes and Linear Interpolation) 
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5.5. Model and Estimation 
Empirical analysis of thls study deals with time varylng 
conditions tha t  lead u p  to the  organizational failure. 
Organizations that were alive In 1990 were treated as  right- 
censored. Slnce the effect of organizahonal age was estimated as  
a hme varying covanate, Cox's proportional hazard model could 
not be used for th ls  s tudy.  Following Allison's (1982) 
recommendation, we employed discrete event history analysis. A 
discrete-time hazard rate 1s defined by: 
P,t = Pr IT, = tl TI 2 t, x,,], 
where T is the dlscrete random variable giving the uncensored 
time of falure (Allison (1982)) P,, 1s the conditional probability 
that firm i ulll die at bme t, given that lt has not already died. 
Specifically, we used the complementary log-log function, since 
the model has an advantage over the logit function m handllng 
non-unlform observation intervals. The complementary log-log 
functlon assumes  t ha t  the  da t a  a re  generated by the  
continuous-time proportional hazard model and thus  the 
coefficient vector is invariant to the length of time ~ntervals 
(Allisod (1982)) The model is expressed as. 
log I - log (1 - P,Jl = at + x , ,  P, 
where a, is a funchon of time, X,, is a row vector of firm f s  state 
variables at time t, and P is a column vector of coefficients. In 
estimating the model, we specified at = a. + a,log t .  All 
independent varlables except for dummy varlables for 
observahonal intervals were modeled to have lagglng effects by 
one observation period. In other words, population level 
variables and firm i's state variables a t  time t were used to 
explaln failure dunng bme t and t + d, where d 1s the length of 
observational interval measured m years. A dummy for d was 
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used as an independent variable to explain falure during time t 
and t + d. Procedure with complementary log-log function m SAS 
was used to estimate the models. 
6. Results 
6.1. Replication of Previous Investigations 
When we assumed that we have information only on the 
founding and failing years, there have been 3,062 organizations 
in the history of Dutch accounting industry. Among them. 2,561 
accounting firms exited in one way or another before 1990. 
Episode-splitting resulted in 1 1 ,119  firm- interval^.^) 
Table 1 presents results from regression analysis with 
complementary log-log function. In Model I ,  density and its 
squared term did not affect the failure rates. The log of age 
showed a significant and negative effect on failure rates, a s  
predicted by the liability of newness hypothesis. Density a t  
founding also had a significant and positlve effect on failure 
rates, indicating that organizations founded at high density were 
more likely to die than organizations founded at low density. 
In Model 11, we added the numbers of prior foundings and 
failures and their square terms. The incremental x2 test (x2 = 
339.79, d f.= 4, p < .001) showed that the addltion significantly 
enhanced the goodness of fit. When they were controlled, the 
density had a predicted U-shaped relation with failure rates. The 
numbers of prior foundings and failures had an  inverted U- 
shaped relation with failure rates. The influence of age and 
density at founding was not different from Model I. Since the 
first-order effect of prlor fallures was not significant, we 
excluded the  variable from Model I1 to obtaln a more 
parsimonious model to get Model 111. Based on Model 111, we 
plotted density against the probability of failure. Figure 4 
presents the relationship between the probability of failure and 
density when all other independent variables were set to zero. 
The figure shows that the density has a U-shaped relation urlth 
4) Means, standard devlabons, and correlabon matrix of vanables are available 
from the author 
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Table 1. Regression Results of Organizational Failure 
(Rephcatmg Prevlous Inveshgahons. 2.708 F'lrms and 11.1 19 F'lrm-Intervals) 
Vanables Model I Model I1 Model 111 
-- 
Intercept -1 976*** -1 837*** -1 848*** 
( 225) ( 230) ( 230) 
Current Interval 1 Year -.969*** -.620*** -.598*** 
( 071) ( 100) 
Current Interval 3 Years 
( 098) 
894*** 853*** 792*** 
( 096) ( 116) ( .103) 
Current Interval 4 Years 135 779*** 841*** 
( 127) ( 146) 
Prevlous Interval 1 Year 
( 136) 
- 302*** 096 077 
( 072) ( 104) ( 103) 
Prevlous Interval 3 Years - 681*** - 305. -.273 
( 169) ( 167) 
Prevlous Interval 4 Years 
( 1611 - 505*** - 955*** -1 059*** 
( 120) ( 160) ( 134) 
Prevlous Interval 5 Years 535*** .864*** 830*** 
( 207) ( 224) ( 221) 
Government Regulabon 19 14- 19 18 - 449** - 042 -.077 
( 201) ( 207) ( 205) 
Government Regulahon 1929 - 158 286 233 
( 205) ( 216) ( 211) 
Government Regulabon 1971-1973 - 278** -2 136*** -2.141"' 
( 112) ( ,166) ( 166) 
Government Regulahon 1984- 1989 935*** - 210 -.231 
( ,141) ( .165) ( 164) 
World War Il 194 1 - 1945 572*** 1 173*** 1 156*** 
( 133) ( 147) ( 147) 
Indonesia's Independence 1949 854*** 957*** 1 019*** 
( 111) ( .136) ( 126) 
Single Associabon (1 if year > 1966) 1 564*** 3 338*** 3 443*** 
( 0651 ( 157) ( 131) 
Log of Organizational Age - 108*** - 283*** - 281*** 
( 021) ( 025) ( 025) 
Denslty at  Foundlng / 100 480*** 167*** 176*** 
( .042) ( .047) 
Density / 100 
( 047) -. 142 -.730*** -.692*** 
( .205) ( .221) ( .219) 
 ensi it^^ / 10000 -.038 .180*** .180*** 
( ,040) ( ,045) 
Pnor Foundings / 100 
( .045) 
1.980*** 2 1 lo*** 
( 463) ( 449) 
Pnor Foundings2 / 10000 -1 500*** -1 600*** 
( 240) ( .240) 
Pnor Fdures /  100 620 
( 524) 
Pnor Falures2 / 10000 - 1 800*** - 1 500*** 
( 3001 ( 0901 
Log-Likel~hood Degrees of Freedom -4936 74.18 -4768 84.22 -4769 54 2 1 
Note Asymtobc standard errors are m parentheses 
p < .lo, **. p < .05, ***. p < .01 (Two-taled test) 
Figure 4. Density and the Probability of Failure 
the probability of failure. 
As the significance level of pnor failures in Model I1 indicated, 
the deletion did not significantly change the log-likelihood (2 = 
1.34, d.f.=l, not significant). We also ran a model w t h  prior 
failures instead of its squared term. 2 test (2 = 12.35, d.f.=l, p 
< .01) to compare Model 111 with Model I1 revealed that the 
deletion of the squared term significantly deteriorated the 
goodness of fit Therefore, we used Model I11 as a baseline model 
to investigate the strength of density dependence hypothesis. 
6.2. Introducing Organizational Heterogeneity 
We constructed another  sample of firms when firm 
heterogeneity variables are considered. The measure of 
organizational founding and failure, that was explained in the 
measurement section, generated 1,805 accountmg firms in the 
history of the Dutch accounting industry One hundred sixty 
three accounting firms disappeared temporarily from the 
directones. Among 1,642 non-missing accounting firms, 1,14 1 
firms dissolved before 1990. Among 1,141 dissolved firms, 790 
firms were terminated, while 351 firms were targets of mergers 
and acquisitions. 
Table 2 presents results from regression analyses with 
complementary log-log function. Model IV and V were based on 
the sample that  we constructed by excluding temporarily 
disappeared firms from the population. When a firm disappeared 
temporarily from the directories, we did not include it in 
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Table 2. Regression Results of Organizational Failure - 
(Under Heterogeneity Assumption) 
Vanables Model IV Model V 
(All Types of Exlts) (Termahon Only) 
B S E  B S E  
Intercept -2 451,'. 922 1 872 1.367 
Current Interval 1 Year - 502*** 121 - 447*** 145 
Current Interval 3 Years 1561*** 151 1639*** 181 
Current Interval 4 Years 705.'. 209 975*** .251 
Prevlous Interval 1 Year -.010 124 - 084 150 
Prevlous Interval 3 Years 013 236 064 .280 
Prevlous Interval 4 Years - 302 201 - 293 248 
Prevlous Interval 5 Years 426 278 085 38 1 
Government Regulation 19 14- 19 18 298 .252 379 .268 
Government Regulahon 1929 052 314 -014 .360 
Government Regulahon 1971-1973 -.683*** 244 -.512 324 
Government Regulation 1984- 1989 293 .240 - 055 .290 
World War I1 194 1 - 1945 1 005*** .196 1 242*** 222 
Indonesia's Independence. 1949 516*** .184 1.040*** 204 
Single Assoclahon (1 if year > 1966) 056 176 074 236 
Log of Organizational Age 134 .089 234.. 117 
Density at Founding / 100 .565*** 088 703*** 111 
Density / 100 -1.510*** .494 -2.4808** .642 
Density2 / 10000 .160f .088 .3408** .I10 
Pnor Foundings / 100 1 080* 632 2 3308** 761 
Pnor Foundings2 / 10000 -1 loo** 470 -1 800f** 550 
Pnor Falures2 / 10000 -2 5008* 1 230 -5 BOO*** 1 520 
Log of Mass 378. 229 - 156 293 
Relahve Sue - 123* 075 -1 367*** 296 
Number of Domestic Offices - 059.. 027 - 147*** 054 
Founded by Split 806*** .150 593** .267 
Cum Number of Mergers 203*** .057 407*** 090 
Cum Number of Acquisilons - 046 069 088 121 
Cum Number of Splits 122 142 229 257 
Cum Number of Name Changes 038 108 035 150 
Partners "From" Cllent Sectors - 096 .094 - 199* .lo5 
Partners 'Taw Client Sectors 066 127 161 177 
General Human Capital (Educabon) - 147* 083 - 379*** 106 
Firm-Specific Human Capital -1 073*** 137 -1 317.'. 168 
Firm-Speclfic Human Capltal2 305*** 034 377*** 040 
Associate/Partner Leverage - 149. 088 - 378** 169 
Temporary Disappearance 
Firm-Intervals 7027 6676 
Log-Likehhood Degrees of Freedom -282 1.84. 35 -2083.46. 35 
Note * p < 10, ** p < .05, *** p < 01 (Two-taled test) 
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Vanables Model lV Model V 
(All Types of Exlts) (Tennabon Only) 
B S E  B S.E. 
Intercept -4 792*** 851 - 932 1 219 
Current Interval 1 Year -5518** 111 -498*** 133 
Current Interval 3 Years 1 500*** .140 1 636*** 166 
Current Interval 4 Years 523*** .I91 7008** 227 
Previous Interval 1 Year .028 116 -005 139 
Previous Interval 3 Years 143 213 .256 248 
Previous Interval 4 Years - 457** 191 -.447* .235 
Prevlous Interval 5 Years .328 266 -.025 374 
Government Regulation 19 14- 19 18 - 034 238 .002 .256 
Government Regulahon 1929 - 081 307 - 083 352 
Government Regulahon 1971-1973 - 707*** 228 - 465 293 
Government Regulation 1984- 1989 227 223 - 181 268 
World War 11: 194 1 - 1945 9108** 182 1 149*** .209 
Indonesia's Independence 1949 934*** 152 1 411*** .172 
Single Association (1 d year > 1966) -.060 .163 - 095 216 
Log of Organizational Age 05 1 062 118 075 
Density at Founding / 100 302*** .072 366*** 089 
Density / 100 -1.800*** .451 -2.820a** .582 
Density2 / 10000 .2208** .O8O .420*** .lo0 
Prior Foundlngs / 100 1.040' .587 2 2608** .708 
Pnor Foundings2 / 10000 -1 000** .430 - 1 6008** 500 
Prior Failures2 / 10000 -3 400C** 1 110 -6.0008** 1.350 
Log of Mass .923*** 211 486* 265 
Relative Size - 134*** 049 -1 244*** 257 
Number of Domestic Offices - 052** .024 - 1608** 051 
Founded by Split 669*** 136 265 244 
Cum Number of Mergers 207*** 052 3818** .084 
Cum Number of Acquisitions -.033 056 .147 .094 
Cum Number of Splits 062 127 -053 227 
Cum Number of Name Changes .lo9 092 .I11 126 
Partners 'From" Client Sectors - 111 .086 -.2018* .096 
Partners 'To" Client Sectors -.066 102 022 136 
General Human Capital (Education) -.080 076 - 255*** 095 
Fum-Specific Human Capital -1.016*** .lo8 -1 1918** 128 
Firm-Speclfic Human Capital2 308*** 028 363*** .034 
Associate/Partner Leverage -.182** 084 - 457*** .161 
Temporary Disappearance - 933*** 104 -1 095*** 123 
Fum-Intervals 11 119 10726 
Log-Likelihood. Degrees of Freedom -3450 36 36 -2590.90 36 
Note: *: p < .lo, **: p < 05; ***. p < .O1 (Two-tailed test) 
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counting density, relative size, and  mass.  In Model IV, 
termination and being a target of merger and acquisition were 
treated as  the same h n d  of events. Consistent with the density 
dependence hypothesis, the density had a significant U-shaped 
relation with failure rates. The density at founding also had a 
strong and positive effect on falure rates. However, the effect of 
firm age disappeared in the model. The effects of variables 
proxying the population dynamics were not changed from Model 
111. 
Among organizational heterogeneity variables, relative size. 
leverage rabo, and the number of domestic offices had negative 
effects on failure. The average firm-specific human capital had a 
U-shaped relahon with the failure rates. The cumulative number 
of mergers in  which a focal organization was engaged 
significantly increased the failure rates. Other organizational 
changes did not have any significant effect in this model. Log of 
mass had a marginal positive effect on f d u r e  rates, suggestmg 
that the emergence of large firms slightly increased the falure 
rates of small firms. 
In Model V, we treated the last observation interval of 
organizations that were the target of mergers and acquisitions as 
nght-censored. In the model, density had a significant U-shaped 
relation m t h  termination rates. Compared m t h  its effect in 
Model IV, density became more significant in explaining 
termination. Other major changes in the results from Model IV 
were the effects of firm age, organization's social capital, and 
general human capital. Contradicting the liability of newness 
argument ,  the  log of firm age had a positive effect on  
termmation. The social capital and general human capital that 
an organization enjoys through its members had significant and 
negahve influences on termination. 
Model VI and VII were based on the sample when we took into 
account the issue of temporarily disappeared firms through 
interpolation. We interpolated firm size, human and social 
capital, the number of domestic offices, and leverage ratio. It 
was based on the assumption that those firms were operatmg 
during their missing intervals bu t  were not listed in the 
directones and that they changed linearly during those mtervals. 
Because of this interpolation, density, relative size, and mass 
differed from those measured for Model IV and V. Among 1,304 
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dissolving firms, 9 1 1 firms expenenced termmation while 393 
firms were the targets of mergers and acquisitions. 
In Model VI, we treated termination and being a target of 
mergers and acquisitions as the same class of events. Consistent 
with the denslty dependence hypothesis, denslty had a 
significant U-shaped relation w t h  falure rates. The denslty at 
founding also had a strong and positive effect on failure. 
However, firm age had a positlve effect. The effects of other 
variables did not significantly change from Model N. 
In Model VII, we treated the last observation Interval of 
organizations that were targets of mergers and acquisitions as 
right-censored. In the model, density had a significant U-shaped 
relation with termination rates. Other major change from Model 
V was the effect of firm age. The log of firm age had no effect on 
terminatlon. The results of Model VI and VII showed that the 
findings were not sensitive to the specification of temporarily 
disappeared firms. 
We also ran the same models from Model IV to Model VII with 
the sample that we treated a firm founded by a merger as a new 
firm, not as a continuation of one of the Involving firms. Results 
were not sigmficantly different from those presented m Table 2. 
All the results suggested that denslty had a stable and strong 
curvilinear effect on organizational fallures even when major 
organizational heterogeneity vanables were controlled. In sum, 
results supported density dependence hypothesis rather than an 
alternative explanation. 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
The present study tested denslty dependence hypothesis. 
Alternative explanations for the S-shaped growth curve of 
density suggested that the addition of organlzational innovabons 
and other cnhcal firm heterogeneity indicators would render the 
effect of denslty on failure ra tes  insignificant. Strongly 
supporting Hannan and Freeman's density dependence 
hypothesis (Hannan and Freeman (1 987, 1989)), empirical 
analysis of the population of Dutch accounting firms showed 
tha t  the  density had a strong and consistent U-shaped 
association with failure rates even when major organlzational 
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level variables were controlled for. The results also Indicated a 
s t rong support  for Carroll and  Hannan's  density delay 
hypothesis (Carroll and Hannan (1989b)) even when the 
organizatlonal characteristlcs were controlled. The natural 
logarithm of firm age dld not have the predicted negatlve effect 
on failure rates when organizational characteristics were 
controlled. 
Delacro~x et al. (1989) argued tha t  the effects of prior 
foundings and failures, instead of the density, can explain the S- 
shaped growth curve of density. The present study showed that 
the density dld not affect organlzational failure when the 
numbers of pnor foundings and failures were not controlled. 
However, the present study showed that the density had a 
strong U-shaped relatlon wlth the failure rates when those 
numbers were controlled The number of pnor foundmgs Itself 
had an inverted U-shaped relation w t h  the falure rates. It may 
suggest that a small number of prior foundings may increase the 
competition but that the large number of prior foundings may 
lndlcate the development of new nlches such a s  increasing 
demand for accounting and consulting services from small 
busmesses and individuals. The number of pnor falures had an 
accelerating negatlve Influence on the fallure rates. The findings 
favored Hannan and Carroll's (1992) argument that the denslty 
dependence hypothesis 1s not incompatible mth  the population 
dynamlcs argument - the effects of prior foundlngs and 
failures. 
Slnce all empirical studles can suffer from unobserved 
heterogeneity, we cannot reject the possiblllty that the strong 
support for denslty dependence hypothesis m this study is due 
to other unobserved vanables, for example stable network ties 
w t h  large sued clients or CPA's family background. However, 
the strong support for the denslty dependence hypothesis, even 
with fine-grained organizational level factors controlled, promdes 
suggestwe emdence for the hypothesis. 
When the literature of innovation and market development 
was taken lnto account, the strong support for the denslty 
dependence hypothes~s 1s somewhat surprising. The findlng may 
be related to the peculianty in the accounting industry. Even 
when some accounting firms adopted an mnovation, these firms 
did not experience instantaneous growth rate and thus dld not 
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drive out small accounhng firms from the market. The followng 
are the reasons that  accounting firms cannot grow 
instantaneously even mth a vlable organizational innovation, 
and that industry shake-out from innovations cannot take place. 
First, accounting firms are not able to grow instantaneously 
due to their partnership arrangement wth  unlimited liability. 
Under the arrangement, partners are responsible for the loss 
that other partners create Accounting firms, consequently, are 
very conservative in hiring new partners or in promoting 
associates to partners. The arrangement constrains the 
instantaneous membership growth, even when a structural 
innovation that enables a large partnership is adopted. 
Second, there is a relat~onal ~nertia independent of intra- 
organizational inertia. As Levinthal and Fichman (1988) 
observed, the relationship between accounting firms and their 
clients is stable rather than volatile. The relational specificity 
between the semce-providers and their clients is responsible for 
the stable relation (Levmthal and Fichman (1988), Uzzi (1996), 
and Baker, Faulkner and Fisher (1998)). Difficulty experienced 
by clients in measuring the quality of accounting services may 
also be responsible for the stability. The difficulty renders the 
relational ties central when the clients select their service- 
providers. The relational inertia prohibits rapid growth of 
accounting firms. 
Third, the development of new market niches enables small 
firms to survive. As the complexity of tax regulation has 
increased. the demand for accounting services by small 
businesses and individuals has also increased. Small businesses 
and indinduals are more price sensitive than large corporate 
clients are. Premium pricing by large accounting firms forces 
small pnce-sensitive clients to choose small accounting firms. 
Small clients also prefer service providers that are easily 
accessible. As a result, we can observe a positive relationship 
between the size of the client's business and the firm size of 
professional service provlders. 
In sum, internal and relational inertia that accounting firms 
have prevent them from growng instantaneously and, thus, 
driving out small firms from the market. Small accounting firms 
also may proactively respond to competitive pressure generated 
by the emergence of large accounting firms by migrating into 
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new market niches. Because of those reasons, we observed 
steady Increase m the number of single proprietors accompanied 
mth  the emergence of large accounting firms m the history of 
the Dutch accounting industry. 
The present study showed that the density had a predicted U- 
shaped relahon with failure rates even when fine-grained proxles 
for organizatlonal heterogeneity were controlled. The findings 
supported Hannan and Carroll's (1992) argument that the 
density dependence argument is compatible with innovation 
literature. Having strong structural ~nertia forces, organizations 
investigated here had a limit on instantaneous organizatlonal 
growth. In other words, the dnving force behlnd the evolution of 
thls Industry may not be innovations In addltlon, accounting 
industry is not a homogeneous goods industry, which Nelson 
and Winter's evolutlonaq model almost always assumes. In a 
heterogeneous goods industry mth multiple niches, Nelson and 
Winter's argument may not work. The Industry characteristics 
may explain why t he  addltlon of innovation and  firm 
heterogeneity variables cannot wash out the effect of densitjr. 
Future studies on populations in whlch innovations lead to 
instantaneous growth may provide more lnformatlon about the 
compatibility of density dependence hypothesis and the 
literature of evolutionary economics. 
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